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INTRODUCTION
Discussions of corporate governance often focus solely on the
attractiveness of firms to investors, but it is also true that firms seek out
preferred investors.1 What, then, are the characteristics of an attractive
investor? With over $5 trillion in assets,2 sovereign wealth funds
(“SWFs”) are increasingly important players in equity markets in the
United States and abroad, and possess characteristics that firms prize:
deep pockets, long-term (and for some, theoretically infinite) investment
horizons, and potential network benefits that many other shareholders
cannot offer. Indeed, in a recent BNY Mellon survey of large
corporations, SWFs were identified as particularly attractive investors.3
The survey report notes that “[w]hile in 2010 47% of corporates
reported engaging with SWFs, in 2012 that had grown to 62%.”4 But
the report also notes an important concern for U.S. markets: of the
companies reporting engagement with SWFs, companies based in
Western Europe had the highest rate of engagement, with 79% of
corporations reporting discussions with SWFs. On the other hand, at
49%, North American companies had the lowest rate of engagement
with sovereign investors.5
Despite their economic power, their reach, and their general
desirability as investors, SWFs are almost entirely disengaged from
corporate governance matters in U.S. firms. Indeed, with the exception
of Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global,6 SWFs are notable
primarily just for their passivity as shareholders. It is well documented
that SWFs present unique challenges not only to the countries in which
they invest, but also to their own domestic governments and citizenbeneficiaries, and it is these varied political challenges that provide the
1. See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 849 (2012).
2. See Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SWF INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/
fund-rankings (last visited June 2, 2013).
3. See BNY MELLON, GLOBAL TRENDS IN INVESTOR RELATIONS 9 (2012),
available at http://www.adrbnymellon.com/files/PB30916.pdf.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Larry Catá Backer has written extensively on Norway’s investment behavior.
See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational
Legislative Power: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets
(Consortium for Peace & Ethics, Working Paper No. 2012-11/11, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2177778.
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strongest explanation for SWFs’ relative passivity in corporate
governance.7 But complete passivity has a dark side, especially when
combined with a long-term investment horizon. If, like consumers,
shareholders’ two primary means of affecting corporate behavior are
voice and exit,8 then passive SWFs are not simply a non-factor in
corporate governance, but may also have a negative effect by holding
large, inert share blocks that could be held by more engaged
shareholders who would be more vigilant in containing managerial
agency costs.
Given the domestic and external political and regulatory factors
that discourage SWF engagement in U.S. corporate governance, how
can SWFs provide appropriate stewardship over their equity
investments? This article answers that question by describing how
SWFs and regulators can create the crucial “space” necessary for SWF
engagement in corporate governance.
The analysis proceeds in four substantive sections. Part I lays out a
definition of SWFs and describes SWF investment patterns. Part II
reviews empirical evidence on SWF investment behavior and the effects
that the investment has on firm values, and then examines evidence on
SWF activities in corporate governance. Part III discusses the key
factors that limit SWF involvement in corporate governance activities.
Part IV describes how, given these limitations, SWFs may engage in
governance without triggering regulatory reprisals, and how regulators
can encourage SWF investment and engagement.
I. DEFINING SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
Defining a role for SWFs in corporate governance requires us to
first define the universe of funds to which the term “SWF” applies.
There are several categories of funds owned and controlled by sovereign
entities, including sovereign wealth funds, central reserve funds (often
used as currency stabilization funds), and sovereign pension funds.9 The
two that are most important for corporate governance are SWFs and
7. Bassan notes that SWFs are beginning to emerge as more important players in
corporate governance generally. See FABIO BASSAN, THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS 6 (2011). This is not the case in the U.S., however, as this article explains.
8. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
9. See Eva Van der Zee, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Socially Responsible
Investing: Do’s and Don’ts, 9 EUR. COMPANY L. 141, 143 (2012).
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sovereign pension funds. Sovereign pension funds face many of the
same issues as SWFs in terms of investment decisions and governance,
but have important differences from SWFs that become clear as one
defines the term “sovereign wealth fund”.
Like hedge funds, SWFs resist definition.10 This challenge is
exacerbated by connotations of the term “SWF”—funds may wish to be
excluded from the definition for various reasons, including concerns that
the label “SWF” carries a stigma that impacts the regulation of their
investments. But while some funds that lie at the definitional fringes
seek to distance themselves from the label, others have no choice but to
own it—and, they might hope, to control the brand effects associated
with the term—since they fall within every common definition of a
“sovereign wealth fund.” For this reason, a logical place to begin is by
looking at the definition offered by a self-selected group of funds, the
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (“IWG”):
SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or
arrangements, owned by the general government. Created by the
general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold,
manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and
employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in
foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of
balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations,
the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts
resulting from commodity exports.
This definition excludes, inter alia, foreign currency reserve assets
held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments
or monetary policy purposes, operations of state-owned enterprises
in the traditional sense, government-employee pension funds, or
11
assets managed for the benefit of individuals.

10. There are numerous definitions of SWFs. As one author observed:
The differences in definition reflect the ambiguity of the instrument itself: It is
formally sovereign but functionally private. Moreover, it is not possible to treat all
SWFs alike: They differ in size, age, structure, funding sources, governance, policy
objectives, risk/return profiles, investment horizons, eligible asset classes and
instruments, transparency, and accessibility.

Id. at 142.
11. INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES—”SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES”
27 (2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf
[hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES].
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To add further clarity to this definition, the IWG notes three key
elements that define a SWF:


Ownership: SWFs are owned by the general government, which
includes both central government and subnational governments.



Investments: The investment strategies include investments in
foreign financial assets, so it excludes those funds that solely
invest in domestic assets.



Purposes and Objectives: Established by the general
government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs are created to
invest government funds to achieve financial objectives, and
(may) have liabilities that are only broadly defined, thus
allowing SWFs to employ a wide range of investment strategies
with a medium- to long-term timescale. SWFs are created to
serve a different objective than, for example, reserve portfolios
held only for traditional balance of payments purposes. While
SWFs may include reserve assets, the intention is not to regard
all reserve assets as SWFs.

Furthermore, the reference in the definition that SWFs are
“commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses,
official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations,
fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports”
reflects both the traditional background to the creation of SWFs—
the revenues received from mineral wealth—and the more recent
12
approach of transferring “excess reserves.”

The IWG definition is relatively precise, but other, independent
definitions offer comparable precision with greater economy of text.
For example, a leading academic commentator on SWFs offers this
more concise definition that largely encompasses the same group of
funds:
[A] SWF [is a] government-owned and controlled (directly or
indirectly) investment fund that ha[s] no outside liabilities or
beneficiaries (beyond the government or the citizenry in abstract)
and that invests [its] assets, either in the short or long term,

12.

Id.
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according to the interests and objectives of the sponsoring
13
government.

This definition, like the IWG definition, focuses on SWFs from an
objective perspective—a SWF has or adopts certain characteristics and
may explicitly ally itself with other funds, as in the case of the IWG, in
order to promote a shared vision of what a SWF is and should be in the
hope that regulators will provide standardized, predictable policy
responses to SWF investment activity.
As I argue in this article, however, SWF investment activity is
inherently fact intensive. As a descriptive matter, SWF investment has
political and economic dimensions that do not fit into objective
definitions attempting to contain a fund within a set of governance
assumptions and investment practices. I take it that it is in respect of
this context—in which scholars and SWFs themselves offer objective
and even soothing connotations, while host countries often view SWFs
as latent threats, irrespective of how the SWFs define themselves and
irrespective of whatever best practices they agree to abide by—that
Bassan offers the following definition:
SWFs are “funds established, owned and operated by local or central
governments, which investment strategies include acquisition of
equity interests in companies listed on international markets
operating in sectors considered strategic by their countries of
14
incorporation.”

This definition seems closest to the mark for my argument here:
SWF investments, and the regulation of such investments, are best
understood within a fluid and dynamic political environment. In this
dynamic environment, certainty will be difficult to achieve without two
fundamental anchor points that I attempt to set out in the article. First,
SWF investment objectives and governance activities must become both
more transparent and more stable (from both the perspective of
individual SWFs and in the aggregate). Second, host countries must
provide the kind of transparency and predictability in regulation that
they seek from SWFs as investors. The next Part builds a foundation for
13. Ashby H.B. Monk, Is CalPERS a Sovereign Wealth Fund?, ISSUE IN BRIEF
(Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA), Dec. 2008, at 1, 4,
available at http://www.publicpensionsonline.com/public/images/
CalPERS%20Sovereignity.pdf.
14. BASSAN, supra note 7, at 9.
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these points by setting out the available empirical evidence on SWF
investing and corporate governance activity.
II. EVIDENCE ON SWF INVESTMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS
Sovereign wealth funds are some of the largest funds in the world.
Depending on the market, they may make up a large portion of the total
equity holder base.15 In the U.S., sovereign wealth funds have invested
broadly in many different companies. As of the end of 2009, for
example, China Investment Corp. (“CIC”) held securities in over 60
different U.S.-listed companies.16
In general terms, sovereign wealth fund holdings as a group are
smaller than “conventional” institutions, such as insurance companies,
mutual funds, and pension funds, but in aggregate have significantly
more assets under management than private equity funds and hedge
funds (notwithstanding that they are prominent clients of both),17 and,
because they are relatively few in number, tend to have a relatively
larger amount of assets under management. The following chart shows
the relative holdings of these different types of institutional investors:

15. Of the firms listed on the Italian Borsa, for example, SWFs are thought to
control up to 36% of the total market capitalization. See Chiara Albanese, Sovereign
Wealth Funds Increase Exposure to Milan Stock Exchange, INVESTMENT EUROPE (Nov.
8, 2012), http://www.investmenteurope.net/investment-europe/news/2223332/
sovereign-wealth-funds-weight-36-of-italys-stock-exchange-mps.
16. See China Inv. Corp., Report for the Calendar Year or Quarter Ended:
December 31, 2009 (Form 13-F) (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1468702/000095012310009135/0000950123-10-009135.txt.
17. See THECITYUK, FINANCIAL MARKETS SERIES: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 3
(2012), available at http://www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/SWF-2012.pdf.
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Global Fund Management Industry, AUM as of year-end 2011
(USD in trillions)18
1.3
2.6 1.8
4.2

Pension funds

29.9

Mutual funds
Insurance funds

24.6

SWFs
Private equity
Hedge funds
ETFs

24.7
Source: TheCityUK

Popular reaction to SWFs has ranged from fears that SWFs are
politically-motivated to a belief, noted earlier, that SWFs are ideal
investors: patient, passive and deep-pocketed. Academics and thinktanks have produced a number of studies in recent years to test these
varied notions.
As a general matter, SWFs are, in theory, the quintessential longterm investor. They can and do invest through a wide array of
investment vehicles, including hedge funds, private equity funds, direct
equity investments, fixed income products, real estate, and
infrastructure.19 SWFs tend to invest like other large institutional
investors, although some studies have detected political influences on
SWF investing, such as home bias; many public pension funds face the
same challenge of politicization.
Scholars have produced a number of studies in recent years
analyzing SWF investment behavior, as well as market responses to
investment behavior and the effect of sovereign investment on firm
18.
19.

Id. at 1 fig.2.
For example, Ohio State University recently leased its parking operations to
QIC, a “leading provider of dynamic investment solutions for sovereign wealth funds,
superannuation funds and other institutional investors.” Who Is QIC?, QIC DYNAMIC
INV. SOLUTIONS, http://www.qic.com.au/who-is-qic/ (last updated Mar. 31, 2013).
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values. The following section reviews the literature studying the share
price effects of investments by SWFs and other types of governmentcontrolled entities.
A. SWF INVESTMENT ACTIVITY AND MARKET RESPONSES
A necessary caveat before reviewing the available literature on
SWF investment activity: all empirical literature on SWFs must contend
with very small sample sizes. This problem is sometimes overlooked as
authors attempt to generalize the results of their study to SWFs as a
group, even though only a relatively small number of funds were studied
and the results may be entirely dependent on the activities of one or two
funds. In this light, these studies are like pieces of a puzzle made from a
partially developed photograph: they provide useful hints of SWF
behavior, but they do not present a full and clear picture.
Keeping that limitation in mind, a number of studies have found
that markets react positively to investments by SWFs and other
government-controlled entities. Karolyi and Liao find that cumulative
market-adjusted stock price reactions to announcements of cross-border
acquisitions by government-controlled entities are significant and
positive, with a median stock price jump of 6% during a 3-day
announcement day window.20 However, they find that SWFs, compared
to other government-controlled entities, have significantly smaller (yet
still positive) stock price reactions to announced investments.21 They
suggest that although a number of countries—including the U.S. through
recent amendments to its foreign investment regulation via the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”)—have
increased scrutiny and regulation of foreign investments and especially
investments by foreign government-controlled enterprises; the market
response to these investments indicates that heightened scrutiny may not
be necessary.22 On the other hand, they note that the more tepid investor
response to SWFs suggests that “[g]reater attention on SWFs as a
particular type of acquirer may indeed be worthy of further scrutiny.”23
20. See G. Andrew Karolyi & Rose C. Liao, What Is Different About GovernmentControlled Acquirers In Cross-Border Acquisitions?, FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
[FEEM] 29 (2009) (It.).
21. See id. at 25.
22. See id. at 29.
23. Id. The authors note that they did not attempt to separate SWFs by
transparency or governance characteristics.
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Aside from SWFs, government-controlled acquirers in general receive
the same market response as corporate acquirers.24
Unlike the Karolyi study, Kotter and Lel attempt to account for
differences in SWF governance and transparency in their evaluation of
market reactions to SWF investments.25 They find that SWFs, like
corporate acquirers, target firms that are poorly performing, cash
constrained, and financially distressed.26 This effect is more prominent
with transparent SWFs compared to more opaque SWFs.27 Taken
together, they find that the short-term stock price effect for SWF
investment is positive, but increases as the SWF is increasingly
transparent and the firm is increasingly distressed.28 They also find
evidence that SWFs tend to be passive shareholders because the
performance and governance of the target firms do not change
significantly over the long term.29
Fernandes compiles and analyzes a large dataset of over 42,000
SWF investments in over 8,000 companies located within 58 countries.30
He documents a positive short-term price response to SWF investment
as well as longer-term improvements in target firm operating
performance as measured by higher Tobin’s Q, return on assets, return
on equity, and higher operating returns.31 He notes that some of the
“channels of impact” for SWFs include “better access to capital,
monitoring, and access to foreign product[ion] markets.”32 His evidence
suggests that SWFs can make a significant positive contribution to longterm shareholder value.33 Intriguingly, his study suggests that SWFs
may even push for governance changes at certain firms, as evidenced by
a significant change in the CEO turnover rate following large SWF

24.
25.

See id. at 30.
See generally Jason Kotter & Ugur Lel, Friends or Foes? Target Selection
Decisions of Sovereign Wealth Funds and Their Consequences, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 360,
367–76 (2011).
26. See id. at 380.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Nuno Fernandes, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investment Choices and
Implications Around the World, IMD INTERNATIONAL 11 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341692.
31. See id. at 13–24.
32. Id. at 31.
33. See id. at 30.
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investments; this is notwithstanding the fact that most SWF investments
do not involve partial or complete control of target firms.34
Dewenter et al. also review stock price reaction to SWF investment,
and find that the announcement of SWF investment tends to accompany
a significant positive stock price response.35 On the other hand,
divestment by SWFs typically accompanies a significant negative stock
price reaction,36 which could suggest either that other shareholders
believe that SWFs are aware of negative material, non-public
information, or that firm value is expected to decline because the SWF
will no longer add value through monitoring or lobbying services
provided by the SWF.37 They also find that the market response to SWF
purchases varies with the size of the transaction: the positive price
impact increases with the size of the investment up to a point, then
begins to decline.38 SWF divestments show the opposite effect, with
price declining in relation to the size of the divestment, then
increasing.39 They also find that, similar to the theory suggested by
Shleifer and Vishny with respect to large shareholding blocks generally,
SWFs exhibit monitoring, influence, lobbying, and possibly tunneling.40
Taken together, these effects suggest that shareholders view SWF
investment as increasingly positive as the investments become large
enough for the SWF to have an influence on the governance of the firm,
but not so large that the SWF is able to tunnel or otherwise extract
significant control benefits from the investment. Finally, Dewenter et
al. note that relative SWF transparency, as measured by the SWF’s
Truman score, does not seem to be linked to stock price reactions, but
that the Truman score may be positively related to long-term target
performance.41

34.
35.

See id. at 25–26.
Kathryn L. Dewenter, Xi Han & Paul H. Malatesta, Firm Values and Sovereign
Wealth Fund Investments, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 256 (2010).
36. See id. at 258–59.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 257.
39. See id.
40. See id. (citing Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large
Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986)).
41. See id. at 269.
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In a similar study, Sojli and Tham examine the effects of SWF
investment on both the target firms and the sponsoring government.42
They find a positive market reaction to SWF and SOE investment, and
find evidence to suggest that the positive reaction is related to
expectations that SWFs will provide monitoring and access to foreign
markets, as well as increased internationalization of the business.43 As
with the Fernandes study, Sojli and Tham draw the conclusion that the
benefits to shareholders from foreign political connections outweigh the
costs of private benefit extraction by the SWF at the expense of other
shareholders.44 The study results also suggest that SWF sponsor
countries benefit from SWF investment through the transfer of knowhow and certification of the SWFs home market.45
Avedaño and Santiso address arguments that SWFs should be
treated as non-governmental investors, such as hedge funds, pension
funds, and mutual funds, by comparing SWF investment activity to
investments by mutual funds.46 They find that while SWFs do engage in
different asset allocation strategies (an unsurprising result given that
mutual funds tend to be specific asset-targeted investment vehicles, and
SWFs tend to invest much more broadly, as would an endowment fund
or a pension fund), the motives suggested by their investment choices do
not appear to differ radically.47 They also review the effect of the target
country political regime on investment decisions, and find evidence that
SWFs are again similar to mutual fund investments in that they do not
make asset allocation strategies based on the political regime of a target
company’s domicile.48
A few other studies have found negative results from SWF
investment. Knill et al. document a statistically significant decrease in
firm performance, a smaller but significant decrease in firm volatility,
42. See Elvira Sojli & Wing Wah Tham, The Impact of Foreign Government
Investments on Corporate Performance: Evidence from the U.S. (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540555&download=yes.
43. See id. at 14–16.
44. See id. at 29.
45. See id.
46. See Rolando Avendaño & Javier Santiso, Are Sovereign Wealth Funds
Politically Biased? A Comparison With Mutual Funds (OECD Dev. Ctr., Working
Paper No. 283, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1525545&download=yes.
47. See id. at 29.
48. See id.
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and a statistically significant decrease in market returns.49 They note,
however, that media attention may drive the market return results
because, they report, “cross correlations found in the media coverage
sub-sample suggest that in their coverage of SWF news the media may
be partly culpable for the very negative characteristics that they report to
fear (i.e., destabilization).”50 In a subsequent paper, Knill et al. also
study the connection between political relations and investment
allocation decisions.51 They find that, contrary to the predictions of
most analyses of foreign direct investment, SWFs are more likely to
invest in countries with which they have weaker political relations,
although the significance of the findings are dependent on the particular
bilateral relationship.52 They draw the conclusion that SWFs do not
appear to make decisions as purely economic actors would —politics do
appear to play a role in investment allocation decisions.53 They also find
evidence that while political relations play a role in determining which
countries to invest in, politics plays no significant role in determining
how much to invest.54 SWF investment between relatively closed
countries (such as China, India, and Indonesia) tends to improve
political relations between the countries, while investment between open
countries (such as France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States) tends to deteriorate political relations.55
Johan et al. provide evidence that political relations may affect
SWF investment decisions.56 The study specifically looks at SWF
investment in private equity firms, as some anecdotal evidence suggests
that SWFs seek private equity investment as a way to insulate their
investments from the scrutiny that might accompany a direct public
49. See April M. Knill, Bong-Soo Lee & Nathan Mauck, ‘Sleeping with the
Enemy’ or ‘An Ounce of Prevention’: Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments and Market
Destabilization 13–16 (Inst. for Monetary and Econ. Research, The Bank of Korea,
Working Paper No. 404, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1353131.
50. Id. at 24.
51. See April Knill, Bong-Soo Lee & Nathan Mauck, Bilateral Political Relations
and Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment 3 (Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1498518.
52. See id. at 27.
53. See id. at 27–28.
54. See id. at 28.
55. See id.
56. See Sofia Johan, April Knill & Nathan Mauck, Determinants of Sovereign
Wealth Fund Investment in Private Equity 3–4 (TILEC Discussion Paper, No. 2010044, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722206.
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equity investment.57 Their results do not provide conclusive evidence
that SWFs invest in private equity for political reasons, but do show a
pattern of SWF investment that differs from other large investors.58
They also document a difference in investment patterns between the
most transparent SWFs—which are less likely to be investing for
political reasons because of the increased visibility of both their
investment decisions and their investment policies—and less transparent
SWFs.59 The study also provides evidence that SWFs do not seek
private equity investment to take advantage of strong investor protection
laws in the target firms’ jurisdiction; on the other hand, the evidence
does allow for the interpretation that SWFs may use private equity
investment to take advantage of lax investor protection laws “to fulfil
[sic] political goals if required to do so.”60 Taken together, the results
suggest that SWFs use private equity investment as a means to mitigate
or avoid negative attention related to their investments.61
Bortolotti et al. provide a comprehensive analysis of SWF
investment behavior by examining SWF investment patterns by fund,
industry sector, and geography.62 They find that SWFs tend to buy
significant minority stakes directly from companies rather than through
open-market purchases. The stock purchased tends to be issued
expressly for the transaction and is available only to the SWF and no
other investors.63 This suggests that target firms actively seek SWF
investment and that “funds become the allies of target-firm managers
and are thus constrained from playing a meaningful disciplinary or
monitoring role.”64 They also note that SWFs face significant pressure
from target firms’ jurisdictions to remain passive owners—in their
phrasing, that they are “constrained foreign state investors.”65 They
document a positive stock price reaction to SWF investment in the
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id. at 3.
Id. at 22.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See Bernardo Bortolotti, Veljko Fotak, William L. Megginson & William F.
Miracky, Quiet Leviathans: Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment, Passivity, and the
Value of the Firm 28 (Oct. 25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.centrobaffi.unibocconi.it/wps/allegatiCTP/SWF-paper-RFS-Finaloct25_2010.pdf.
63. See id. at 28–29.
64. Id. at 29.
65. Id. at 9.
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three-day window surrounding the SWF purchase.66 However, contrary
to other studies, they find significant and larger negative returns to SWF
investments in the three years following the initial investment.67 They
find that SWFs rarely seek board seats, and that this effect is more
pronounced with investments made in firms based in OECD countries.68
Further, firm performance appears to deteriorate when SWFs take seats
on target firm boards.69 As with the Dewenter study, Bortolotti et al.
find that the size of the SWF investment is important: long-run returns
are negatively related to the size of the stake in the target firm, and are
also negatively related to the size of the target firm.70 Their results
provide support for the notion that SWFs are constrained investors that
are “especially reluctant to ‘interfere’ in target firm management by
demanding high performance or by holding managers to account.”71
Finally, Paltrinieri and Pichler reviewed the portfolio choices of 56
SWFs to test whether they, like other institutional investors such as
pension funds and mutual funds, invest to “maximise the risk-return
ratio subject to the pursuit of specific institutional goals (stabilisation,
saving, intergenerational transfer of wealth).”72 They find similar
motivations in the medium- to long-term, but then find that some SWFs
tend to display home bias, and that “[t]his [is] particularly evident for
SWFs based in the U.S. and Europe, but was less obvious for Middle
Eastern SWFs; Asia-Pacific region funds showed mixed behaviour.”73
Taken together, several trends emerge from these studies. First,
shareholders tend to view SWF investment positively, but also appear
wary of political activity by SWFs. For their part, SWFs tend not to
seek to engage in “controlling” behavior at firms in which they invest.
There is some suggestion that SWFs will seek to avoid scrutiny of their
investments, a suggestion that should not be surprising if, as I argue,
SWFs are concerned with protectionist behavior by the countries in
which they invest. Some SWF investment behavior also indicates
political influence, although the influence tends to be directed to
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. at 16.
See id. at 1.
See id.
See id.
See generally id.
Id. at 29.
Andrea Paltrinieri & Flavio Pichler, Are Sovereign Wealth Funds Different? 20
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
73. Id.
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domestic ends, such as “home bias” investments in local enterprises as a
means to deploy capital to struggling local firms.
B. REGULATORY INDICATORS OF SWF INVESTMENT
1. CFIUS
The article now turns from investor reaction to SWF investment to
regulatory indicators of SWF investment. While most of the studies
reviewed above looked at SWF investment across various markets, this
section will explore SWF investments in the U.S. While detailed data
on U.S. investments by SWFs is somewhat limited,74 the U.S. does make
available summary information on sovereign investment generally
(which includes investment not just by SWFs by also by state-owned or
controlled enterprises). Foreign investments by state-owned or statecontrolled enterprises are covered under the Defense Production Act of
195075 as amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act
of 2001.76 Under those statutes, parties to a “covered transaction,”
which includes mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers by or with any
foreign person that could result in foreign control of an entity engaged in
interstate commerce, may file a voluntary notice filing with the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”).77
After receiving notice, a CFIUS staffer will determine whether the
notice is complete and otherwise in compliance with the filing
requirements, and, if so, will circulate the notice to all of the CFIUS
members.78 CFIUS then has thirty days in which to review the
74. As discussed in Part IV.A below, this is due in part to a lack of transparency by
SWFs.
75. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).
76. See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
121 Stat. 246 (to be codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
77. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3), (b)(1).
78. See Process Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-overview.aspx
(last
updated Dec. 1, 2010, 8:08 AM). CFIUS includes the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, the Attorney General of the United States, the Secretary of
Energy, the Secretary of Labor (nonvoting, ex officio), the Director of National
Intelligence (nonvoting, ex officio), and “[t]he heads of any other executive department,
agency, or office, as the President determines appropriate, generally or on a case-bycase basis.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2).
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transaction.79 The purpose of the review is to “identify and address, as
appropriate, any national security concerns that arise as a result of the
transaction.”80 CFIUS members may ask the parties to provide
additional information concerning the transaction.81 Most CFIUS
reviews end favorably within the initial thirty-day review period.82
However, some transactions require a separate, more extensive
investigation following or in lieu of the thirty-day review. A forty-fiveday investigation is required for transactions that (1) threaten to impair
the national security of the United States, and that threat has not been
mitigated during or prior to a thirty-day review; (2) transactions
involving a foreign government-controlled entity (including a SWF); (3)
transactions that would result in control of any U.S. “critical
infrastructure”83 by or on behalf of any foreign entity, and CFIUS
determines that the transaction could impair national security, and that
the risk of impairment has not been mitigated by agreement with or
assurances by the foreign entity; or (4) the lead agency tasked with
review of the CFIUS’s advice recommends, and CFIUS concurs, that an
investigation be undertaken.84 If after review and/or investigation
CFIUS determines that the transaction does not present an unmitigated
national security risk and the President has not elected to take action on
the transaction pursuant to his authority to so do under the statutes,85
CFIUS grants the transacting parties a “safe harbor” for the
transaction.86
SWFs tend to avoid taking large stakes in U.S. businesses.87 This is
partly the case because of the broad definition of control set out in the
Treasury’s regulations. Under those regulations:

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E).
See Process Overview, supra note 78.
See id.
See id.
“The term ‘critical infrastructure’ means, subject to rules issued under this
section, systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that
the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact
on national security.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(6).
84. See id. § 2170(b)(2).
85. See id. § 2170(d).
86. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.601 (2012); see also Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg.
779 (Dec. 27, 1988).
87. See infra Part II.B.2.
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The term control means the power, direct or indirect, whether or not
exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant
minority of the total outstanding voting interest in an entity, board
representation, proxy voting, a special share, contractual
arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or
other means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters
affecting an entity; in particular, but without limitation, to determine,
direct, take, reach, or cause decisions regarding . . . important
88
matters affecting an entity.

SWFs operate under suspicion from many host country regulators,
including CFIUS, and thus tend to avoid controlling or even influencing
their portfolio companies. Undoubtedly, this suspicion is felt more
strongly towards investments originating from countries that are
political rivals than from countries that are allies. This is borne out by
the following chart, which shows summary information regarding
covered transactions (including transactions by SWFs) and the country
of the bidder:

88. The regulations include a number of examples of behavior that might be
deemed to constitute “control” for purposes of the statute, including: “(1) The sale,
lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of any of the tangible
or intangible principal assets of the entity, whether or not in the ordinary course of
business; (2) The reorganization, merger, or dissolution of the entity; (3) The closing,
relocation, or substantial alteration of the production,
operational, or research and development facilities of the entity; (4) Major expenditures
or investments, issuances of equity or debt, or dividend payments by the entity, or
approval of the operating budget of the entity; (5) The selection of new business lines or
ventures that the entity will pursue; (6) The entry into, termination, or non-fulfillment
by the entity of significant contracts; (7) The policies or procedures of the entity
governing the treatment of nonpublic technical, financial, or other proprietary
information of the entity; (8) The appointment or dismissal of officers or senior
managers; (9) The appointment or dismissal of employees with access to sensitive
technology or classified U.S. Government information; or (10) The amendment of the
Articles of Incorporation, constituent agreement, or other organizational documents of
the entity with respect to the matters described in paragraphs (a)(1) through (9) of this
section.” 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a) (2012).
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Covered Transaction by Acquirer’s Home Country/Economy,
2008–1089
Country/Economy

2008

2009

United Kingdom

48

17

26

91

France

12

7

6

25

Canada

6

9

9

24

Israel

12

5

7

24

Japan

8

4

7

19

China

6

4

6

16

Australia

11

1

3

15

Russia

8

4

12

Italy

5

2

3

10

Netherlands

2

4

2

8

3

5

8

1

2

6

2

6

1

5

Sweden

2010

Total

Germany

3

Switzerland

4

UAE

2

Lebanon

4

Spain

1

Hong Kong

1

Austria

2

2

Brazil

2

2

India

1

2

4
1

3

4

1

3

1

2

If one takes account of the size of the economies of these home
countries, there seems to be relatively little correlation between the size
of the economy (or the SWF, for those countries that have them) and the
number of transactions involving foreign control of U.S. enterprises. By
contrast, close political allies tend to dominate the top end of the list,
with the UK-based enterprises engaging in nearly as many covered
transactions as the next four countries combined.

89. COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT
[hereinafter CFIUS ANNUAL REPORT].

TO

CONGRESS (2011)
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2. 13D and 13G Filings
Section 13 filings also provide an important indicator of SWF
investment behavior. Pursuant to Schedule 13D, 5% or greater
beneficial owners must provide, among other things, their name,
information about criminal and civil proceedings, the source of funds
used or to be used in making purchases, and the purpose of the
transaction.90 The description of the purpose of the transaction must
include discussion of any plans that relate to or would result in the
acquisition of additional securities, changes in management or the board
of directors, changes in the capital structure of the corporation, and
changes in the articles and bylaws of the company. Schedule 13D must
be filed within ten days of the acquisition.91
A Schedule 13D filing serves as a useful proxy to gauge whether an
investor intends to use his investment power to influence a corporation.
By contrast, a person who would otherwise be required to file under
13(d) may instead use the shorter Schedule 13G92 if the person
“acquired such securities in the ordinary course of his business and not
with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the
control of the issuer, nor in connection with or as a participant in any
transaction having such purpose or effect,”93 and the person falls under
one of the enumerated categories of institutional investors set out in the
rules under 13(d).94 This list includes banks, investment advisers,
investment companies, broker-dealers, insurance companies, or foreign
entities that are “the functional equivalent of any of the institutions
[listed above] so long as the non-U.S. institution is subject to a
regulatory scheme that is substantially comparable to the regulatory
scheme applicable to the equivalent U.S. institution.”95 Schedule 13G
requires many of the same identifying disclosures that are found on
Schedule 13G, such as name, residence, and the amount of securities
held by the filer, but does not require disclosure of the purposes of the
transaction96 (it being assumed that the purpose is for passive
investment, and not for purposes of control and management of the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2012).
See id.
See id. § 240.13d-1(b).
Id. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i).
Id. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(ii)(J).
Id.
See id. § 240.13d-102.
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company). In contrast to the relatively short ten-day filing requirement
under Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G need only be filed within forty-five
days after the end of the calendar year in which the ownership exceeded
(and at the end of the calendar year remains greater than) 5%.97
Sovereign wealth funds and other governmental acquirers of listed
securities file under both Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G, just as nongovernmental acquirers do. The fact that SWFs do file under 13D
demonstrates that at least in some instances SWFs are seeking or
possess active influence, if not outright control, of listed companies.
However, the chart98 below, covering all 13D and 13G filings by the
largest SWFs, shows that few SWFs make investments large enough to
require a filing under either Schedule 13D or 13G.
Assets
($Billion)
$ 627.0

Fund Name

SC
13D

SC
13G

0

2

Norway

6

24

Country

$ 593.0

Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
Government Pension Fund –
Global

UAE -Abu Dhabi

$ 482.0

China Investment Corporation

China

5

4

$ 296.0

Kuwait Investment Authority

Kuwait

0

1

97. See id. § 240.13d-1(b)(2). As a proviso to this requirement, the rule also states
that “if the person’s direct or indirect beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent of the
class of equity securities prior to the end of the calendar year, the initial Schedule 13G
shall be filed within 10 days after the end of the first month in which the person’s direct
or indirect beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent of the class of equity securities,
computed as of the last day of the month.” Id.
98. The chart is based on the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute’s (SWFI) ranking of
the largest sovereign wealth funds, and so makes use of the SWFI’s definition of a
sovereign wealth fund. Under their definition, “[a] Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) is a
state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from balance of
payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations,
governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from
resource exports. The definition of sovereign wealth fund exclude (sic), among other
things, foreign currency reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional
balance of payments or monetary policy purposes, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in
the traditional sense, government-employee pension funds (funded by
employee/employer contributions), or assets managed for the benefit of individuals.”
What Is a SWF?, SWF INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund/ (last
visited June 2, 2013).
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$ 157.5

Temasek Holdings

Singapore

0

12

$ 100.0

Qatar Investment Authority

Qatar

0

3

III. SWF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES AND RESPONSES TO
REGULATION
Having reviewed available evidence on investor responses to SWF
investment and regulatory indicators of significant SWF investments,
the article now turns to evidence of SWF corporate governance
engagement strategies, and then explains why SWFs tend to take a
passive role in corporate governance with respect to their U.S.
investments.
A. SWF STRATEGIES
Although some of the studies discussed above reviewed some
aspects of governance engagement by SWFs (notably, Bortolotti et al.
considered whether SWFs took board seats at companies in which they
invested), the most comprehensive evaluation of SWF behavior in
corporate governance is found in Mehrpouya, Huang and Barnett’s
comprehensive 2009 study99 reviewing the proxy voting and
engagement policies and practices of SWFs. The study examined the
behavior of the largest ten SWFs: Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
(ADIA), Australian Government Future Fund (AGFF), China
Investment Corporation (CIC), Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation (GIC), Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Libyan
Investment Authority (LIA), Norway’s Government Pension Fund
Global (GPFG), Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), Russian Reserve
Fund (RRF) and National Wealth Fund (NWF), and Temasek Holdings
(Singapore).100 All but the Russian funds—RRF and NWF—held equity
positions at the time of the study.101
Obtaining information on engagement and proxy voting is difficult
because most countries do not require disclosure of shareholders’ proxy

99. See AFSHIN MEHRPOUYA, CHAONI HUANG & TIMOTHY BARNETT, IRRC
INSTITUTE, AN ANALYSIS OF PROXY VOTING AND ENGAGEMENT POLICIES AND
PRACTICES OF THE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 30–41 (2009), available at
http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Sovereign_Wealth_Funds_Report-October_2009.pdf.
100. See id. at 15.
101. See id. at 55 fig.17.
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votes.102 Most SWFs (like many other institutional investors) do not
publish data on their proxy votes, though Norway’s GPFG is a notable
exception to this rule; the authors were therefore required to search
numerous public and proprietary sources103 to find indications of SWF
engagement and proxy voting behavior.104 The authors looked at several
markers of engagement, such as whether the SWF seeks board seats,
whether it actively votes its shares, whether it makes other engagement
efforts (such as direct contact with management), whether the SWF has
proxy voting guidelines, and whether it discloses proxy votes.105
A board seat would allow the SWF a more active role in
management, but would create a heightened risk that the SWF would
use its influence to extract private (and possibly political) benefits.106
Unsurprisingly, the authors found little evidence of SWFs seeking board
seats.107 They found that when SWFs do hold board seats, the cases fall
into two categories: the first where a SWF holds a large percentage of
the outstanding shares or has historically held controlling stake,108 and
the second (rarer) case in which a SWF holds a non-controlling stake,
but nevertheless secures a board seat.109 They note two such instances,
one of which involves an 8% shareholding in German company GEA
Group by KIA, and the other a 10% holding in Beijing Capital
International Airport by GIC.110
As noted above, most SWFs do not disclose their proxy policies.
Of the ten largest SWFs, only GPFG discloses its proxy voting
102.
103.

See id. at 21.
The study was supervised by RiskMetrics Group, Inc. (the parent company of
proxy advisor Institutional Shareholder Services), which itself was under contract with
the IRRC Institute, both of which may be assumed to own or have access to proprietary
information on shareholder voting practices.
104. See MEHRPOUYA, HUANG & BARNETT, supra note 99, at 21.
105. See id. at fig.9.
106. See id. at 21.
107. The result is unsurprising since, as the authors note, “due to the lack of
disclosure on their board seat-seeking strategy, it is very difficult to assess to what
extent SWFs either hold board seats or engage to appoint or approve board members.”
Id. at 22. But given the fact that SWFs tend to own relatively small blocks of shares,
see infra Part III.B.7, it would also be surprising if SWFs were willing and able to
secure board seats.
108. Temasek is an example of this type, “most likely due to the nature of Temasek
as a vehicle to take over management of government assets.” MEHRPOUYA, HUANG &
BARNETT, supra note 99, at 22.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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policies.111 GPFG’s proxy voting policies are based on guidelines from
the OECD’s Principles for Corporate Governance, the OECD’s
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the UN Global
Compact.112 The authors report that, while not disclosing detailed proxy
voting policies, “[a] number of the funds, including KIA and Temasek
indicate that they exercise their shareholder rights, including voting on
resolutions, in order to protect their financial interests.”113 In its most
recent annual report (following the publication of the Mehrpouya,
Huang and Barnett study), CIC also provides some discussion of its
proxy voting and corporate engagement approach:
As a financial investor, we usually maintain a minority shareholder
status and do not seek to control or influence investee companies.
Nor do we always exercise our full ownership rights. When we do,
we are consistent with our investment policy to protect the value of
our investment. CIC continues to strengthen its postinvestment
management process and strives to do what we can as a minority
shareholder to help our investee companies achieve success. By
helping these companies thrive, we also fulfills [sic] our own value
114
creation objectives.

As with proxy voting policies, only GPFG discloses actual proxy
votes.115 This lack of transparency makes it difficult to ascertain
whether SWFs behave similarly to other types of funds, such as pension
funds, endowment funds, or mutual funds.116 Although a few countries,
including Italy, require disclosure of actual proxy votes, there are
insufficient investments in these jurisdictions with which to draw
definitive conclusions about SWF proxy voting behavior.117 However,
from interviews with some prominent SWF portfolio companies, the
authors were able to determine that most SWFs exercise their proxy
voting rights.118 They also noted examples of engagement with
management.119 As suggested by the language from CIC’s annual
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id.
See id.
Id.
CHINA INVESTMENT CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 26 (2011), available at
http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/include/resources/CIC_2011_annualreport_en.pdf.
115. See MEHRPOUYA, HUANG & BARNETT, supra note 99, at 23.
116. See id. at 22.
117. See id. at 23.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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report, SWFs may attempt to engage management in an effort to
enhance the value of their investment.120 In some cases, portfolio
company managers have close relationships with SWFs.121 Norges
Bank Investment Management, which manages GPFG, has an extensive
program that engages companies on corporate governance,
environmental, human rights and other issues.122 The authors report that
“[i]n 2008, NBIM engaged with 16 companies on corporate governance
and shareholder rights; with 19 companies on child labor, risk
management in the supply chain, and board competence; and with ten
companies about their stance on greenhouse gas emissions.”123 Aside
from GPFG and a handful of examples of engagement that are
connected to large equity purchases, it is unclear to what extent SWFs
attempt to take an active role in influencing management of their
portfolio companies. The available evidence suggests that SWFs are
passive investors. The following section seeks to explain why this is the
case.
B. EXPLAINING SWF PASSIVITY
As Balding has stated, sovereign wealth funds operate at the
intersection of money and politics.124 This puts the managers of
SWFs—who in some cases are bureaucrats with experience in the
sponsor country’s central bank or ministry of finance, or in other cases
professional managers recruited from private financial services firms—
in a position that requires balancing of both domestic pressures
(financial, such as the responsibility to meet an internal benchmark, and
internal political pressures to invest locally) and foreign (political
pressures from host governments). This section sets out the ways in
which SWF managers respond to these pressures and shows how the
investment behavior of SWFs is directly shaped by both foreign and
domestic pressure.

120. As noted above, Fernandes argues that SWFs achieve this through channels of
impact that include better access to capital, monitoring, and access to foreign product
markets. See Fernandes, supra note 30, at 31.
121. MEHRPOUYA, HUANG & BARNETT, supra note 99, at 26.
122. See id. at 40.
123. Id. at 26.
124. See CHRISTOPHER BALDING, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THE NEW
INTERSECTION OF MONEY & POLITICS (2012).
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The numerous explanations for SWF passivity have been discussed
amply elsewhere,125 and only a brief review of these pressures is
necessary here. The following is not a definitive list of the factors (and,
particularly, regulations) that may affect ownership decisions, but does
reflect the most important of these factors from the perspective of a
sovereign wealth fund.
1. Taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Under section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code, income earned by
foreign governments on investments in the United States in stocks,
bonds, or other domestic securities, financial instruments held in the
execution of governmental financial or monetary policy, or interest on
deposits in banks in the United States, is exempt from taxation.126 This
exemption does not apply to commercial activity, however, with the
justification that as an extension of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
section 892’s exemption should be limited to activities that are related to
sovereign activities of the government, as opposed to commercial
activities.127 The definition of commercial activity under section 892
turns on whether income was received from a controlled commercial
entity, a term defined to mean:
[A]ny entity engaged in commercial activities (whether within or
outside the United States) if the government (i) holds (directly or
indirectly) any interest in such entity which (by value or voting
interest) is 50 percent or more of the total of such interests in such
entity, or (ii) holds (directly or indirectly) any other interest in such
entity which provides the foreign government with effective control
128
of such entity.

125. See, e.g., Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Active or Passive Investors?,
118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 104 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/2008/11/24/rose.html.
126. See I.R.C. § 892 (2006).
127. This explicit distinction was codified by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006); for a discussion of the development of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act and Section 892, see N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION,
REPORT ON THE TAX EXEMPTION FOR FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS UNDER SECTION 892 OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 14–16 (2008), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/
ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1157report.pdf.
128. I.R.C. § 892(a)(2)(B).
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Because “effective control” may come at shareholdings
significantly below 50%, SWFs have a tax incentive to avoid making
investments that might trigger tax liability under section 892.129
2. Regulation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States
As discussed above, CFIUS reviews every covered transaction in
which a foreign government-controlled entity takes control of a U.S.
firm. The definition of control is the crucial trigger in determining not
only whether the transaction will be deemed a covered transaction, but,
assuming the threshold of control is passed, whether it may result in a
mitigation arrangement that reduces the ability of the foreign
government-controlled entity to control the target firm. The Treasury
regulations promulgated after the FINSA amendments to the ExonFlorio framework not only clarifies in what situations the investor might
be deemed to have taken a controlling stake in a target firm, but also
encourage interests acquired and held passively.130 Section 800.302 of
the regulations, which lists “[t]ransactions that are not covered
transactions,” includes the following safe harbor:
(b) A transaction that results in a foreign person holding ten percent
or less of the outstanding voting interest in a U.S. business
(regardless of the dollar value of the interest so acquired), but only if
the transaction is solely for the purpose of passive investment. (See
131
§ 800.223.)

Although the 10% safe harbor provides some comfort, the Treasury
also makes clear that holdings of less than 10% are not presumptively
passive.132 The regulations further clarify that an ownership interest is
129. For arguments that SWFs should not receive the benefit of Section 892’s
exemption, see Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 440 (2009); for arguments that the exemption should stand, see Matthew A.
Melone, Should the United States Tax Sovereign Wealth Funds, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 143
(2008) and Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Taxing the Bandit Kings, 118
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 98 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/2008/11/17/
desaidharmapala.html.
130. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.302(b) (2012).
131. Id.
132. See id. The regulations include the following examples:
Example 1. In an open market purchase solely for the purpose of passive investment,
Corporation A, a foreign person, acquires seven percent of the voting securities of

940

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

held for the purpose of passive investment if “the person holding or
acquiring such interests does not plan or intend to exercise control, does
not possess or develop any purpose other than passive investment, and
does not take any action inconsistent with holding or acquiring such
interests solely for the purpose of passive investment.”133
If an investment does not clearly fall within the safe harbor, CFIUS
may require a mitigation agreement. Under the statute, “[CFIUS] or a
lead agency may, on behalf of the Committee, negotiate, enter into or
impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with any party to the
covered transaction in order to mitigate any threat to the national
security of the United States.”134 There are two primary hurdles that
CFIUS must overcome before entering into a mitigation agreement with
a party undertaking a covered transaction. First, CFIUS must provide “a
written analysis that identifies the national security risk posed by the
covered transaction and sets forth the risk mitigation measures that the
CFIUS member(s) preparing the analysis believe(s) are reasonably

Corporation X, which is a U.S. business. Assuming no other relevant facts, the
acquisition of the securities is not a covered transaction.
Example 2. Corporation A, a foreign person, acquires nine percent of the voting
shares of Corporation X, a U.S. business. Corporation A also negotiates contractual
rights that give it the power to control important matters of Corporation X. The
acquisition by Corporation A of the voting shares of Corporation X is not solely for
the purpose of passive investment and is a covered transaction.
Example 3. Corporation A, a foreign person, acquires five percent of the voting shares
in Corporation B, a U.S. business. In addition to the securities, Corporation A obtains
the right to appoint one out of eleven seats on Corporation B’s Board of Directors.
The acquisition by Corporation A of Corporation B’s securities is not solely for the
purpose of passive investment. Whether the transaction is a covered transaction would
depend on whether Corporation A obtains control of Corporation B as a result of the
transaction).

Id.
133. 31 C.F.R. § 800.223 (2012).
illustration:

This section also contains the following

Example. Corporation A, a foreign person, acquires a voting interest in Corporation B,
a U.S. business. In addition to the voting interest, Corporation A negotiates the right
to appoint a member of Corporation B’s Board of Directors. The acquisition by
Corporation A of a voting interest in Corporation B is not solely for the purpose of
passive investment.

Id.
134. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(l)(1)(A) (2006). The statute also states that “[a]ny
agreement entered into or condition imposed under subparagraph (A) shall be based on
a risk-based analysis, conducted by the Committee, of the threat to national security of
the covered transaction.” Id. § 2170(l)(1)(B).
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necessary to address the risk.”135 CFIUS must then, as a committee,
agree that “risk mitigation is appropriate and must approve the proposed
mitigation measures.”136 Second, “CFIUS may pursue a risk mitigation
measure intended to address a particular risk only if provisions of law
other than section 721 do not adequately address the risk.”137 If, for
example, another statute or set of regulations, such as the National
Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (“NISPOM”) adequately
mitigates the risk posed by the investment, then CFIUS would not enter
into a separate mitigation agreement.138
When analyzing the investment and governance behavior of SWFs,
generalizations often conceal important issues arising between specific
SWFs and home countries. While CFIUS lets the overwhelming
majority of transactions pass through review without requiring a further
investigation or imposing a mitigation agreement,139 the earlier analysis
of the bilateral behavior of acquisition activity originating from certain
SWF sponsor countries (particularly China) suggests caution in viewing
the CFIUS process as overwhelmingly successful for foreign investors.
For which SWF is CFIUS review most likely to be successful? It seems
135. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted By the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,567 (Dec. 8,
2008) [hereinafter CFIUS Guidance]. With respect to the identification of risk,
Executive Order 11,858 (as amended by Executive Order 13,456) clarifies that the
assessment of risk must be “based on factors including the threat (taking into account
the Director of National Intelligence’s threat analysis), vulnerabilities, and potential
consequences.” Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4,677, 4,679 (Jan. 23, 2008).
Mitigation agreements are (and are intended to be) rare. As discussed in the Treasury’s
guidance, “CFIUS may not, except in extraordinary circumstances, require that a party
to a transaction recognize, state its intent to comply with, or consent to the exercise of
any authorities under existing provisions of law.” CFIUS Guidance, supra at 74,568
n.4. Between 2008 and 2010, CFIUS received 313 notices of covered transactions. Of
these, ninety-three resulted in investigations, and only sixteen resulted in mitigation
agreements. CFIUS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 89, at 3.
136. CFIUS Guidance, supra note 135, at 74,568.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 74,568–69.
139. See David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL.
L. REV. 81, 87 (2009) (quoting Alan Holmer of the U.S. Treasury as explaining to a
Chinese audience that “less than 10 percent of all foreign direct investments were
reviewed by [CFIUS], and the vast majority of those were resolved without
controversy, including those by state-owned enterprises.” Press Release, Alan F.
Holmer, Special Envoy for China, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury (May 21, 2008), available at
http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/052108p.html).
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obvious that it is likely to be more successful for SWFs from countries
that are not political rivals with the United States. It should not come as
a surprise that CFIUS might view an acquisition by a Chinese SWF
differently from an acquisition by a large Canadian pension fund. China
poses concerns for the U.S. government that Canada or Norway does
not. What is problematic, however, is the perception—and perhaps
reality—that Chinese investment is actively discouraged. This concern
is particularly worrisome when the U.S. political climate tends to reward
such discouragement; this is perhaps most likely to be the case in an
election year, when charges of being soft on China or other political or
economic rivals become especially pronounced. Suspicions of this
brand of politicization were recently expressed by Gao Xiqing, the Cice
Chairman and President of China Investment Corporation, who
according to reports said that “when CIC seeks to invest in the United
States, despite the fact that U.S. infrastructure is in pretty dire straits, he
is politely asked to look elsewhere, even when the investment represents
only a small stake.”140 No doubt referring to CFIUS, Gao stated that
while roadblocks to investment in the United States appear to be
technical in nature, they are in reality political: “It’s not serendipity, it’s
by design.”141 The U.S. regulatory structure thus presents an irony:
while U.S. regulations have actively promoted shareholder engagement
(to take just two recent examples, through the SEC’s failed efforts to
promote proxy access and Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay regulations), the
CFIUS rules work against engaged SWF investment.
3. Securities Regulations
Several securities regulations may also impact the extent of a
SWF’s holdings in U.S. listed companies. As noted above, holdings of
over 5% of a company’s outstanding stock may necessitate disclosures
as dictated by sections 13G or 13D of the Exchange Act of 1934.142 A
more important limitation, not unique to SWFs but acting as a deterrent
to large block holdings generally, is section 16 of the Exchange Act.
Section 16 has two relevant components. First, section 16(a) imposes

140. Len Costa, China Investment Corp.’s Gao Xiqing: Economy “Still on Right
Track”, CFA INST. (Oct. 9, 2012), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2012/10/09/
china-investment-corp-s-gao-xi-qing-economy-still-on-right-track/.
141. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
142. See supra Part III.A.2.
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potentially burdensome disclosure obligations on any person who
beneficially owns more than 10% of any class of equity security.143
Beneficial ownership of shares may be determined by reference to the
definition under Exchange Act Rule 13d-3, which, among other things,
links ownership investment and voting rights over the shares.144 Section
16 reporting includes the filing of Form 3145 once section 16’s 10%
threshold has been passed; statements of changes in the beneficial
ownership of the shares under Form 4;146 and an annual statement filed
under Form 5.147
Second, section 16(b) imposes what is known as the “short-swing
profit rule”, which forces disgorgement of any profits made by the
section 16 filer on any sale and purchase, or purchase and sale, within a
given six-month period.148 Unlike the Exchange Act’s general antifraud
provision, section 10(b),149 the section 16 filer need not be in possession
of material or non-public information, and need not have acted with
scienter. Indeed, through the matching rules under section 16(b), a
series of trades need not produce a profit to result in liability; only a
single matched pair, within a six-month time frame, need show a
profit.150 As Bernard Black has noted, “[t]hese rules create a strong
incentive not to cross the 10% threshold. The forfeiture rules greatly
143. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2006).
144. See Rule 13d-3 provides that:
For the purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Act a beneficial owner of a
security includes any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract,
arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares: (1) Voting
power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the voting of, such security;
and/or, (2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct the
disposition of, such security.

General Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-3(a) (2012). The rules also provide that persons will be deemed to have
beneficial ownership of a security if they have the right to acquire a security through the
exercise of options, warrants, conversion rights, or pursuant to the automatic
termination of or the power to revoke a trust, discretionary account, or similar
arrangement. Id. § 240.13d-3(d).
145. See Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form 3), available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form3.pdf.
146. See Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form4.pdf.
147. See Annual Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form
5), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form5.pdf.
148. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006).
149. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
150. See, e.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943).
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reduce a shareholder’s liquidity, and the reporting burden is substantial,
especially for a large institution which is frequently buying and
selling.”151
Black also cites additional federal securities regulations that
generally discourage investors from becoming a “control person,”152
including the limitations on the sale of stock imposed by Rule 144 of the
Securities Act153 and potential liability for the corporation’s activities
under section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 20 of the
Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC defines control very broadly, so that
ownership amounting to as little as 10% might be considered a control
stake for purposes of the statutes and regulations.154

151. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
545 (1990).
152. The term “control person” is not defined in the Securities Act of 1933 or the
Exchange Act of 1934, but Rule 405 under the Securities Act provides the following:
The term control (including the terms controlling, controlled by, and under common
control with) means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause
the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.

General Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(2012).
153. See id. § 230.144(e)(1) (imposing on “affiliates” a limitation on the number of
shares that may be sold in a given 3-month period to the greater of one percent of the
outstanding shares or the average weekly trading volume during the four prior calendar
weeks). Under Rule 405 of the Securities Act, an “affiliate” is defined as “a person that
directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by,
or is under common control with, the person specified.” Id. § 230.405. The SEC
determines whether a person is an affiliate through a fact-specific inquiry that focuses
on the Rule 405 definition of control cited above, which keys on the power to direct or
cause the direction of management and the policies of the company. A filing with the
SEC is required if the affiliate intends to sell in excess of 5,000 shares or securities with
a value over $50,000. Id. § 230.144(h).
154. Black notes:
The standard practitioner’s advice is that a 10% holding “should create caution” and
might even “creat[e] a rebuttable presumption of control, especially if such holdings
are combined with executive office, membership on the board, or wide dispersion of
the remainder of the stock.” Thus, control person liability adds an additional strong
impediment to a shareholder or group owning more than 10% of a company’s stock.

Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 151, at 549 (quoting A.A.
Sommer Jr., Who’s “in Control”?—S.E.C., 21 BUS. LAW. 559, 568 (1966).
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4. Transaction Costs and Headline Risk
As I have argued elsewhere, transaction costs may have an effect
on a SWFs’ investment decisions.155 If navigating the CFIUS process
requires significant expenditures of effort by the SWF and its attorneys,
or the SWF fears that the transaction may become politicized, it may
choose to invest elsewhere or to limit the scope of the investment so as
to avoid creating a risk that the transaction would be closely investigated
by CFIUS and, possibly, ultimately blocked.156 Some deal-making
behavior by SWFs may be characterized as a kind of regulatory
arbitrage,157 as SWFs limit investments to ownership levels so as to
avoid CFIUS filings and attention, securities regulations, or other
regulations or internal governance provisions158 that might trigger
increased costs for the SWF.
Transaction costs also play another very important role in
encouraging SWF passivity: they encourage SWFs to avoid appearing
political in their investment and governance decisions. This may be
viewed as “headline risk” for SWFs. SWFs are already viewed with
suspicion by many regulators, and publicity suggesting that a sovereign
155. See Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the Shadow of Regulation
and Politics, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1207, 1207–08 (2009).
156. CFIUS rarely recommends that a transaction be blocked, and the president even
more rarely issues an executive order blocking foreign acquisitions. In fact, 2012 saw
the first blocked transaction since 1990. See Rachelle Younglai, Obama Blocks Chinese
Wind Farms in Oregon Over Security, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2012, 7:15 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-usa-china-turbinesidUSBRE88R19220120928 (“‘This . . . is the first time since 1990 that the president of
the United States has either blocked a transaction from occurring or divested a
transaction that has occurred,’ said Clay Lowery, a former assistant secretary at
Treasury who oversaw the CFIUS process and now is with Rock Creek Global
Advisors.”).
157. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 247 (2010).
158. One example of a governance provision that might affect SWFs is the
shareholder rights plan (or, as they are more commonly known, a “poison pill”)
designed to protect net operating losses (NOLs). Essentially, the pill is designed to
protect a NOL tax asset of the corporation that might be jeopardized under tax laws in
the event of a change in the beneficial ownership of the corporation. Mark D. Gertstein
et al., Lessons From the First Triggering of a Modern Poison Pill: Selectica, Inc. v.
Versata Enterprises, Inc., LATHAM & WATKINS LLP M&A COMMENTARY, Mar. 2009,
at 2, available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2563_1.pdf. A
defining feature of NOL pills is their low trigger point: typically any purchase of 5% or
more of the company’s shares will trigger the pill, compared to a typical poison pill
trigger of 10-20%. Id.
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is using its SWF for political purposes can have a profound effect on the
costs of SWF investment; alarmist portrayals of SWF investment
activity routinely ignore these headline risks and the ways that they
impact large, diversified portfolios. Imagine, in an extreme scenario
involving national security, that a SWF decided to use an investment in
a U.S. firm as a tool of espionage. An SWF makes an investment in a
company and begins to pressure the company for information on certain
operations or products. Leaving aside potential violations of Regulation
FD,159 if a company were to share such information, what would be the
effects? First, CFIUS may be triggered, and the investment could be
frozen or unwound. Second, and more devastatingly, regulators would
take an interest in every other investment made by the SWF. Other
home countries’ regulators, seeing that a SWF investment was used for
political purposes, would apply enhanced scrutiny to existing
investments160 and proposed investments, and countries would likely
consider protectionist regulations governing SWF investment. All of
these effects would dramatically increase the cost of investment by the
SWF: increased legal fees, increased managerial time and effort in
explaining investment decisions, and potential losses as the SWF is
forced to forego or unwind some investments and instead shift funds to
less attractive opportunities.
In a more likely scenario, a SWF may invest for more benign
strategic purposes—arguably, for political purposes in the sense that the
investment extends beyond purely commercial gains for the SWF itself
and serves to further some political end, such as food security or the
support of a local industry. Some of the research reviewed above
159. Regulation FD prohibits selective disclosure to certain shareholders of material,
non-public information. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–03 (2012). In the
hypothetical, one may imagine that the company’s executives might attempt to keep
their disclosure secret. Similar issues arise with Regulation FD. While it is possible, a
company has less incentive to pass along this information than they might in the typical
Regulation FD context, in which companies would pass along information in order to
garner favor with certain analysts. Arguably, however, a company would be less
inclined to serve as the political instrument of a foreign government, especially in cases
involving the transfer of the company’s technology.
160. As an example of this effect’s magnitude on other investments, consider that as
of year-end 2009, China Investment Corporation owned shares in over sixty companies
listed in U.S. markets, and surely owned stock in dozens, perhaps hundreds, of
companies worldwide. China Inv. Corp, Report for the Calendar Year Ended:
December 31, 2009 (Form 13F) (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1468702/000095012310009135/c95690e13fvhr.txt.
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suggests that some SWFs have invested strategically. It is helpful to
distinguish here between strategic investing that implicates the national
security of host nations and strategic investing that does not, since the
U.S. regulatory structure (and most other host country regulations of
foreign investment activity) restricts activity that implicates the host
country’s national security, but does not restrict strategic activity that
might be politically beneficial to the SWF sponsor country without
impacting the national security of the host country. Examples of such
strategic investing may include establishing links to resource-producing
or extracting firms as a means of buttressing resource supplies, or
investing in a firm in order to acquire know-how (for example, a
relationship with a private equity firm may enable a SWF to learn
valuable investment techniques). Assuming such investments are not
prohibited by CFIUS—e.g., there is no unmitigated national security
risk—why, then, does the U.S. not see more such investments from
China and other political rivals? One explanation is that even when
investments do not create national security risk, the use of a SWF for
any purpose that suggests a double-bottom line, whether in the United
States or not, creates headline risk not just for the SWF but also for U.S.
regulators, who may be wary of the perception that U.S. firms are part of
a politically strategic investment program. Or, more simply, the
strategic use of a SWF—CIC, for example, or even other nationallysponsored funds from the same country, such as the China-Africa
Development Fund—may provide political cover to U.S. politicians who
would like to discourage investment for their own political purposes.
5. The Santiago Principles
By design, the IWG’s “Generally Accepted Principles and
Practices,” (“GAPP”) more commonly known as the “Santiago
Principles,”161 are designed to affect SWF investment behavior. The
Santiago Principles were intended, among other things, “to continue to
demonstrate—to home and recipient countries, and the international
financial markets—that the SWF arrangements are properly set up and
investments are made on an economic and financial basis.”162 The
principles are non-binding, however, and many host countries remain
suspicious of SWF motives.
161.
162.

SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 3–6.
Id. at 4.
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The Santiago Principles contain two principles that are especially
relevant to this article. The first, GAPP 19, relates to SWF investment
decisions.163 The second, GAPP 21, relates to SWF participation in
corporate governance.164
GAPP 19 states that “[t]he SWF’s investment decisions should aim
to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with
its investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds.”165
The baseline policy position of the Santiago Principles is commercial,
non-strategic investing. However, Subprinciple 19.1 provides SWFs
with some liberty to deviate from purely return-based investing: “[i]f
investment decisions are subject to other than economic and financial
considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy
and be publicly disclosed.”166 Notwithstanding this liberty, the
commentary on this subprinciple does not discuss strategically-oriented
deviations from return-based investing. It instead references deviations
due to “legally binding international sanctions and social, ethical, or
religious reasons,”167 and specifically mentions Kuwait, New Zealand
and Norway, which all have internally restrictive investment policies.168
The commentary goes on to state that “[m]ore broadly, some SWFs may
address social, environmental, or other factors in their investment
policy. If so, these reasons and factors should be publicly disclosed,”169
a vague principle that would arguably encompass some kinds of
strategic behavior provided the strategic policy is disclosed.
GAPP 21, which addresses governance, states:
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element
of their equity investments’ value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its
ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with
its investment policy and protects the financial value of its
investments. The SWF should publicly disclose its general approach

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See id. at 22.
See id. at 23–23.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.B.6 for a discussion of Norway’s internal investment
restrictions.
169. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 22.
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to voting securities of listed entities, including the key factors
170
guiding its exercise of ownership rights.

The commentary explains:
SWFs’ demonstrated ability to contribute to the stability of global
financial markets results in part from their ability to invest on a longterm, patient basis. The exercise of voting rights is seen to be
important by some SWFs for their capacity to hold assets and
preserve value rather than becoming a forced seller and, by
definition, a shorter-term investor. The exercise of ownership rights
is also seen by some SWFs as a mechanism for keeping the
management of a company accountable to the shareholders, and thus
contributing to good corporate governance and a sound allocation of
171
resources.

6. Internal Political Constraints
Some SWFs, and perhaps particularly those founded in democratic
regimes, may come under pressure to conform their investment and
corporate governance practices with the governance preferences of the
public. As Norway’s GPF-G explains,
[I]nvestors should also share responsibility for how the companies in
which they invest are conducting themselves, for what they are
producing and for how they are treating the environment. The
Government deems it important to integrate this type of
responsibility into the management of the Government Pension
Fund, because it promotes values that are important to the
170. Id.
171. Id. at 22–23. The Commentary continues:
To dispel concerns about potential noneconomic or nonfinancial objectives, SWFs
should disclose ex ante whether and how they exercise their voting rights. This could
include, for example, a public statement that their voting is guided by the objective to
protect the financial interests of the SWF. In addition, SWFs should disclose their
general approach to board representation. When SWFs have board representation,
their directors will perform the applicable fiduciary duties of directors, including
representation of the collective interest of all shareholders. To demonstrate that their
voting decisions continue to be based on economic and financial criteria, SWFs could
also make appropriate ex post disclosures.”

Id. A review of the compliance of ten large SWFs with GAPP 19 and 21 shows that all
ten were in full compliance with GAPP 19, while four were not in compliance, three
were in partial compliance, and three were in full compliance with GAPP 21.
MEHRPOUYA, HUANG & BARNETT, supra note 99, at 60.
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Norwegian people, and because it represents an important
contribution to raising awareness amongst investors and companies
172
domestically and abroad.

As a more general matter, the ability to engage in corporate
governance correlates with long-term investment. Internal political
pressures may make long-term investment objectives more difficult to
obtain. As Dixon and Monk argue,173 sovereign investors may have
difficulty explaining performance results and investment strategies to
their constituencies. But even when funds attempt to provide higherquality disclosure, explanation, and education regarding results and
investment policies, “such a strategy still may prove ineffective and be
trumped by the salience of and desire for short-term performance
metrics.”174 Additionally, “domestic opponents of a country’s SWF
could utilize the poor performance to reinforce their argument against
the existence of the fund or the fund’s strategy.”175 These concerns may
lead SWFs to adopt a short-term investment approach, and/or decrease
transparency to avoid signaling investment strategies.
7. Institutional Constraints
Finally, most SWFs have two significant internal constraints which
limit their effectiveness in corporate governance. The first is structural,
and it is simply the reality that unlike private equity firms and some
hedge funds, SWFs are typically designed to act as broad-based
investors that tend to follow the tenets of modern portfolio theory, which
prescribes diversification of investments across various asset classes.
The very structure of SWFs—often, as decreed by the governing
documents of the SWF—is designed to limit the SWF’s investments in
equity to relatively small positions as part of a larger portfolio that
includes numerous asset classes. This does not prevent SWFs from
engaging in activism, of course; pension funds generally invest

172. Norwegian Ministry of Finance, On the Management of the Government
Pension Fund in 2006 ¶ 4.1.1 (2007), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/
1966215/PDFS/STM200620070024000EN_PDFS.pdf.
173. See Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H.B. Monk, Reconciling Transparency and
Long-Term Investing Within Sovereign Funds, 2 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INVESTMENT
275 (2012).
174. Id. at 280.
175. Id.
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similarly, for example, and many are active shareholders in governance
matters. However, because they hold relatively small amounts of any
given company in the portfolio, SWF managers may believe that they
have relatively little economic incentive to engage in shareholder
activism.176
The second structural concern with SWFs’ ability to engage in
corporate governance matters is that SWFs tend to be relatively thinly
staffed, and more importantly, it appears that none (with the exception
of Norway’s GPFG) invest in governance matters by creating
specialized internal governance-focused groups. To be sure, the
absolute ratio of staff to assets is not dispositive on the issue of whether
the SWF will be able to engage in governance. In 2010, GPFG had a
staff of only 217 employees and $322 billion in assets and engaged
extensively in governance activities,177 while the Qatar Investment
Authority had a staff of 110 and assets of $60 billion and did not engage
in governance.178 However, the many reasons suggested above for why
SWFs are passive and reluctant to engage in governance also help to
explain Norway’s interest in governance. Most particularly, Norway is
a democracy in which the population holds relatively strong views on
social issues, and yet the country is not viewed as a political rival or
potential threat to host countries. At the same time, most other SWFs
come from non-democratic (or less democratic) regimes, and some are
viewed as political rivals to host countries. Both domestic and
international politics are inseparably linked to the ability and will of
SWFs to engage in corporate governance.
IV. TOWARD BI-LATERAL TRANSPARENCY IN SOVEREIGN INVESTING
As SWFs continue to acquire equity interests in the United States
and around the world, questions concerning their proper role in
176. Some scholars, most notably James Hawley and Andrew Williams, have
argued that some large intuitional investors hold a “small but highly diversified cross
section of publicly traded stock (and debt) in the economy, and therefore, have the
characteristic of representing the entire economy.” JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T.
WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN
MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 17 (2000). These investors are thus,
in Hawley and Williams’ theory, “universal owners.” and cannot escape poor corporate
governance by divesting from particular companies. They thus have an incentive to
push for “good governance” across markets. Id.
177. See MEHRPOUYA, HUANG & BARNETT, supra note 99, at 42.
178. See id.
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corporate governance will continue to arise. SWFs have many reasons
to remain overly passive. Some may even hesitate to exercise their
basic voting rights. This is unfortunate, however, because SWFs are
designed to be long-term investors and should be well-incentivized to
provide an important voice in corporate governance matters. How then,
can SWFs manage to avoid the political and regulatory ramifications
that would likely arise from efforts to engage in corporate governance?
In this section, I outline two key roles for transparency and how it links
to the role of SWF in corporate governance. First, SWFs must become
more transparent in their investment decision-making and corporate
governance activities. Second, and equally important, regulators must
be more transparent in how they deal with SWFs.
A. SWF TRANSPARENCY
Because of concerns with the potential politicization of SWFs,
regulators and observers have called on SWFs to become more
transparent in how they invest and in how they engage with their
portfolio companies—for example, how SWFs vote proxies and disclose
proxy-voting policies. Others have attempted to provide benchmarks to
encourage transparency. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, for
example, publishes the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, which
rates SWFs on ten measures of transparency.179
Transparency can be evaluated across a number of dimensions.
Dixon and Monk identify five: political transparency (the fund’s
objectives and relationship with the sponsoring government); procedural
transparency (governance and decision-making procedures); policy
transparency (internal fund operations and policies); operational
179. The criteria are:
(1) the fund provides history including reason for creation, origins of wealth, and
government ownership structure; (2) the fund provides up-to-date independently
audited annual reports; (3) the fund provides ownership percentage of company
holdings, and geographic locations of holdings; (4) the fund provides total portfolio
market value, returns, and management compensation; (5) the fund provides
guidelines in reference to ethical standards, investment policies, and enforcer of
guidelines; (6) the fund provides clear strategies and objectives; (7) if applicable, the
fund clearly identifies subsidiaries and contact information; (8) if applicable, the fund
identifies external managers; (9) the fund manages its own website; (10) the fund
provides main office location address and contact information such as telephone and
fax.

Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, SWF INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/
statistics-research/linaburg-maduell-transparency-index (last visited June 2, 2013).
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transparency (implementation of investment strategies); and
performance transparency (fund outcomes, benchmarking, and risk
profile).180 All of these aspects relate to and build upon one another, and
all have an impact on the ability of a SWF to engage in activism, as well
as signaling what kind of activism the SWF might engage in. For
example, political transparency equates to disclosure of fund motives, as
well as disclosure of the relationship of the sponsor government to the
SWF. These disclosures help establish confidence that the SWF will be
used for commercial purposes. If there is no political transparency, host
country regulators will be inclined to examine transactions more
carefully because of the risk that the SWF will act non-commercially,
and may put in place mitigation agreements (as is not uncommon in the
U.S.) that limit the ability of a SWF to engage in governance. Lack of
transparency thus creates external pressures on SWFs that manifest
themselves through increased regulatory scrutiny and attendant
transaction costs. On the other hand, transparency may also invite
scrutiny of a fund’s holdings and investment practices, which in turn can
create internal popular or political pressures on the fund to alter its
practices. Transparency thus reduces investment frictions, but may also
enhance domestic pressures on the SWF.
While transparency is connected to corporate governance
engagement, obscurity is linked to passivity and disengagement. This
may be a conscious trade-off for many funds: they are willing to forego
corporate governance activities in order to avoid unwanted attention by
either foreign regulators or by politicians, bureaucrats, or citizens of
their own country. It is certainly also the case that even if all SWFs
were highly transparent, some SWFs would still not engage in
governance. First, they may not believe that the benefits of engaging in
corporate governance efforts outweigh the costs. Alternatively, they
may choose to free-ride off the efforts of other investors and avoid the
costs of engagement. For some SWFs, however, engagement has costs
that extend beyond those expended by other investors because SWFs
present risks that most other investors do not. Some kinds of
engagement may be risky for SWF investors in U.S. firms because of
the reach of CFIUS. The U.S. Treasury regulations implementing
FINSA broadly define “control” to encompass activities in which an
investor has the ability to “determine, direct or decide important matters

180.

See Dixon & Monk, supra note 173, at 281–82.
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affecting an entity”181 including major transactions, closing or relocating
operations, dividend payments, equity and debt issuance, selection of
new business lines, entry or termination of significant contracts,
appointment and dismissal of senior officers, or amending the articles of
incorporation.182 These matters typically fall far outside the range of
actions that even the most active shareholders would engage in
(excepting transactionally-oriented activist hedge funds), but what about
aggressively criticizing pay practices at a firm? Or asking a company to
cease dealing with companies in certain countries? These activities
would seem to invite scrutiny, even if the engagement falls comfortably
within “mere influence” and does not suggest control. In other words, if
SWFs engage as “activist” investors, they may worry that they will not
be treated like other investors. Further, the reality faced by SWFs is that
risks presented by sovereign investment differ from one SWF to
another; U.S. regulators likely do not consider the risks presented by
Chile or Norway’s SWFs to be equivalent to the risks presented by
China’s. Thus, the range of governance activities that may be
undertaken by Norway’s GPFG with respect to U.S. firms would be far
greater than what could be undertaken by China’s CIC.
If SWFs are concerned about signaling investments and practices to
the market, it is possible in the U.S. to selectively disclose some
information to regulators without disclosing it to other parties. The SEC
provides a limited exemption for institutional investors who would be
otherwise required to disclose all of their holdings under Form 13F.183
The exemption is intended to protect investment strategies, and so is
limited as to duration (one year) and is generally not used for a large
number of stocks because the SEC requires that “[i]f confidential
treatment is requested as to more than one holding of securities, discuss
each holding separately unless the Manager can identify a class or
classes of holdings as to which the nature of the factual circumstances
and the legal analysis are substantially the same.”184 The SEC also
requires filers to describe, among other things, the investment strategy
being followed, why public disclosure of the securities would be likely
to reveal the investment strategy, and an explanation of how failure to
181.
182.
183.

31 C.F.R § 800.204 (2012).
See id.
See Information Required of Institutional Investment Managers (Form 13F),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/13f.pdf.
184. Id. at 2.
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grant the request for confidential treatment would likely cause
substantial harm to the filer. The exemption does not contemplate
political motivations for requesting confidential treatment, such as the
desire to avoid domestic political pressures.
Unfortunately, most SWFs are not filing 13Fs at all, let alone filing
confidential treatment requests for portions of their holdings. Only two
foreign-based SWFs, Norway’s GPFG and Singapore’s Temasek
Holdings, have filed recent 13Fs.185 As will be discussed in the next
section, SWFs are treated differently from other investors by regulators.
However, in this instance, most SWFs are not acting like other investors,
and because of their status as entities controlled by a sovereign
government, the SEC is limited (by politics, if not by legal authority) in
its ability to enforce its rules against them.
B. ENHANCING REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY
Just as regulators and some observers call for more transparency
from SWFs, SWFs and other observers have raised the need for
enhanced transparency from regulators. The risk of SWF politicization
has been amply discussed, but equally important is the risk that
politicians and regulators from countries in which an SWF seeks to
invest will use the cover of “national security” review to prohibit SWF
investment. In each case, SWF investment has become politicized. This
is not to ignore the reality that SWFs are, indeed, unlike other investors
in important ways, and that regulatory structures must be adapted to take
these differences into account. However, reciprocal transparency helps
to facilitate both the investment decision by the SWF and the analysis of
national security risk (if any) by the regulator.
Lawyers who regularly advise foreign investors (not only SWFs,
but any foreign investor that would be subject to a CFIUS investigation)
are familiar with the transactional frictions that mark the current CFIUS
process. An opinion piece written by two attorneys, Stephen Paul
Mahinka and Sean P. Duffy, outlines these challenges.186 The piece
185. Complete lists of all 13Fs filed by Norges Bank and Temasek Holdings can be
found through SEC’s EDGAR recording system. See Filings & Forms, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html.
186. See Stephen Paul Mahinka & Sean P. Duffy, CFIUS Review Needs Greater
Transparency, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/CfiusReviewNeedsGreaterTransparency_IFLR_11o
ct12.pdf.
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notes that CFIUS could reduce the uncertainty surrounding its reviews
and investigations by “providing brief general summaries of the bases
for its determinations with respect to proposed transactions.”187 CFIUS
provides little clarity to its proceedings except through the annual report
provided to Congress, a portion of which is made public. As described
above, this report provides general statistics about notices submitted,
investigations and reviews initiated, industries involved, and the
nationalities of the bidders. The public report does not provide any
information regarding specific transactions or the mitigation agreements
that may have been entered into as a consequence of an investigation.
Mahinka and Duffy compare this opacity with other agencies:
In contrast, numerous US regulatory and enforcement agencies,
including the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Food
and Drug Administration, commonly provide public statements
describing their decisions, while accommodating confidentiality
concerns. Any similar brief summaries of Cfius’ parameters of
decision would necessarily be circumspect, in view of security
concerns and the need to protect the Agency’s deliberative process.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude that US government, foreign
government, foreign investors and acquirers, and indeed Cfius itself,
would not be better served by a short statement of the parties to the
transaction, the industry involved, and the Agency’s general
rationale for its determination. Such transparency, which would
require an amendment of the Agency’s statute, would enhance the
predictability and likely the legitimacy of Cfius’ decisions, enabling
both US sellers and foreign investors and acquirers to better gauge
Cfius’ probable concerns and more efficiently undertake investments
188
in US businesses.

The recent Ralls suit shows the difficulty in obtaining clarity on
CFIUS decisions. On July 25, 2012, CFIUS issued an order identifying
national security risks associated with the acquisition by Ralls of wind
farms located near a U.S. navy facility.189 Ralls, a subsidiary of Sany,
China’s largest machinery manufacturer, filed a complaint against

187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
See Letter from Aimen N. Mir, CFIUS Staff Chair, Dep’t of the Treasury, to
Stephen Heifetz & Todd J. Guerrero (July 25, 2012), available at
http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/July-CFIUS-Order.pdf.
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CFIUS on September 12.190 The complaint sought, among other things,
an order and judgment declaring that CFIUS violated the APA; that
CFIUS lacks the authority to issue an order prohibiting the Ralls
transaction or regulating future transactions not resulting in foreign
control of a person, and enjoining CFIUS from attempting to do so; and
an order and judgment declaring “arbitrary and capricious” CFIUS’s
determinations that the Ralls transaction falls within CFIUS jurisdiction
and that it presents national security risks.191 Ralls then filed a motion
on September 13 seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.192 Ralls argued that to avoid irreparable harm it needed to
resume construction by September 20, which would allow the company
to finish construction by the end of the year and be eligible to claim $25
million in federal tax credits.193 The suit was thought to have little
chance of success, but did have some interesting implications:
The plaintiffs challenge CFIUS’s procedures for reviewing
transactions. Ralls objects to CFIUS’s failure to provide any
“evidence or explanation for its determination[s]” that the
transaction was a “covered transaction” (and thus under CFIUS
jurisdiction), that the transaction poses national security risks, and
that those risks cannot be mitigated by less-restrictive means than the
overbroad (in Ralls’ view) measures in the amended order. The
challenges should be understood in the context that CFIUS review is
generally confidential (CFIUS does not disclose even the fact that a
review was requested). When CFIUS has a national security
concern, the Committee will often explain to parties that there is
evidence of a national security concern but, in the interest of national
security, the Committee often will not share the reasoning or
evidence with the parties. Here, Ralls is complaining about the
inability to hear or understand the issues. If successful, the suit
could increase the transparency of the review—such as a
requirement that the Committee articulate for the parties its
justification for orders beyond a bare finding of “national security
risk.” It could also open the door for CFIUS to explain the reasons
for recommending to the President that a transaction poses national

190. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on
Foreign Inv. in the U.S., No. 1:12-cv-01513 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2012), ECF No. 1.
191. See id. at 21.
192. See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Ralls
Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., No. 1:12-cv-01513 (D.D.C. Sept. 13,
2012), ECF No. 7.
193. See id. at 2.
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security threats. If this were to come to pass, such disclosure could
194
open the door to fruitful mitigation discussions.

Unfortunately for Ralls, on the recommendation of CFIUS,
President Obama issued an order blocking the transaction, and by statute
the order is not reviewable.195 As noted above, however, there are
important justifications for enhanced transparency of CFIUS actions,
particularly when the transparency takes the form of a short public
statement setting out the reasons for the action. As stated by Mahinka
and Duffy, more disclosure of the bases for its recommendations would
make CFIUS reviews and investigations more predictable and provide
foreign investors with a better sense of the types of investments that are
likely to create national security concerns.196 More generally, an
explanation of its actions would help inoculate CFIUS against claims
that its decisions are susceptible to political manipulation, and that
increased frictions for certain deals, particularly from political and
economic rivals, are not “by design.”197
More disclosure is not a panacea for politicization of SWF
investment, and it is crucial to recognize the limits of transparency.
Transparency does not eliminate political influence in business
transactions, just as more transparency through campaign finance laws
does not eliminate business influence in political elections. But
transparency can raise the costs of improper behavior. In the case of
CFIUS rulemaking, a statement accompanying an action would require
CFIUS to provide principled reasons for its determinations, which could
then be evaluated by the public and other nations. The U.S. has much to
gain from eliminating politicized treatment of foreign investments, and
could take a lead in providing a stable foreign investment environment
that would strengthen the U.S. case when it demands similar treatment
for U.S.-based firms investing in foreign markets.

194. Vinson & Elkins, Chinese Energy Developer Sues Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) for Blocking Oregon Wind-Farm Investment
on National Security Grounds, V&E CFIUS AND NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW ECOMMUNICATION, Sept. 17, 2012, available at http://www.velaw.com/resources/
ChineseEnergyDeveloperSuesCFIUSBlockingOregonWindFarmInvestment.aspx.
195. See Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by
Ralls Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,281 (Sept. 28, 2012).
196. See Mahinka & Duffy, supra note 186.
197. See Costa, supra note 140.
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C. CREATING SPACE FOR SWFS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As noted at the outset, complete passivity may be detrimental to
SWFs and the firms in which they invest. On the other hand, regular,
active engagement may not be necessary or even desirable for all SWFs.
But if SWFs are indeed investing for the long term, how can they play a
meaningful role in corporate governance? In this Part, I will outline
ways in which even the most constrained SWF can find space to play an
important role in corporate governance matters: a role that is not
problematically passive, but does not create regulatory risks for the
SWF.
As noted above, Treasury rules restrict what may be called
“positive” or “offensive” governance.198
Positive or offensive
governance efforts are typified by engagement with management on
social issues, governance changes, and even business matters. Examples
of positive governance outcomes include board nominations,
shareholder proposals, and advice on business strategies. Most of the
shareholders classified as “activist”, including activist hedge funds, and
even some labor union and public pension funds, are engaged in positive
governance efforts. Positive governance efforts, especially those
resulting in strategy changes and changes on board composition, are
more likely to create regulatory concern because they increase the risk
that the SWF is using or could use its influence for non-commercial
purposes.
For SWFs that are viewed by U.S. regulators as presenting more
significant political risks, positive governance is not a realistic option,
even if the SWF intends to only engage in what it believes are
shareholder value-producing governance efforts. However, the same
SWFs may be able to focus on “negative” or “defensive” shareholder
rights.199 Examples of defensive or negative governance include merger
approvals, exercise of voting rights, approval or ratification of
198. See Paul Rose, Qatar Holdings an “Activist Investor”?, THE STATE CAPITALIST
BLOG (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.statecapitalist.org/2012/09/17/qatar-holdings-anactivist-investor/. The typology of “offensive” and “defensive” activism described here
borrows from research on hedge fund activism by Brian R. Cheffins and John Armour
in The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP.
L. 53 (2011).
199. See Rose, supra note 198. See also Paul Rose, Qatar Holdings and SWF
Passivity, THE STATE CAPITALIST BLOG (July 2, 2012), http://www.statecapitalist.org/
2012/07/02/qatar-holdings-and-swf-passivity/.
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transactions in which there is self-dealing, and the creation of bounded
governance structures, such as supermajority approval requirements for
certain transactions or for certain governance changes. Negative or
defensive governance is typified by rules creation and approval of major
events, but passivity with respect to most corporate governance matters.
Qatar’s SWF provides a useful recent example of negative
governance. Qatar Holdings, an investment vehicle of the Qatari SWF,
owned approximately 13% of Xstrata, a large mining company with
operations around the world.200 Glencore, a large commodities trading
and mining company, sought to merge with Xstrata. Glencore held
shares in Xstrata, but because the deal required approval by a majority
of disinterested shareholders, Qatar Holdings’ ownership block was
sufficient to successfully block the merger. Qatar Holdings engaged in
lengthy discussions with Glencore and Xstrata, and consistently held out
for a better deal over months of negotiations (which it succeeded in
getting, even though it was not as much as Qatar Holdings had hoped to
gain). Some viewed Qatar Holdings’ efforts as “activist” investing.201
However, the SWF was not engaged in positive governance, which is
typified by efforts to catalyze change. Indeed, they were acting as a
roadblock, as a check on a management decision that was exceedingly
material to their investment.
Significantly for SWFs, negative governance efforts are implicitly
granted a safe harbor by the Treasury rules. The Treasury rules state
that various activities which fall under the definition of negative
governance outlined above will not trigger the “control” definition under
FINSA, including (1) the power to prevent the sale or pledge of all or
substantially all of the assets of an entity; (2) the power to prevent an
entity from entering into contracts with majority investors or their
affiliates; (3) the power to prevent an entity from guaranteeing the
obligations of majority investors or their affiliates; (4) the power to
purchase an additional interest in an entity to prevent the dilution of an
investor’s pro rata interest; and (5) the power to prevent the change of
200. Jill Treanor, Xstrata investor refuses to back miner’s £140m merger pay
package, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 15, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/
nov/15/xstrata-glencore-merger-qatar-holding.
201. See, e.g., Richard Levick, Game-Changer: Qatar Plays Historic Role in
Glencore’s Bid for Xstrata, FORBES, Sept. 12, 2012; see also Max Nisen, Watch Out
For This Dangerous New Type Of Activist Investor, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 6, 2012, 2:49
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/watch-out-for-this-dangerous-new-type-ofactivist-investor-2012-9.
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existing legal rights or preferences of the particular class of stock held
by the SWF.202 As I have argued elsewhere, this regulatory posture
makes good sense from a policy perspective, because negative rights do
not tend to divert management authority away from the directors and
officers, but instead place limits on the ability of directors and officers
to impair the rights or interests of the negative right-holder. On the
other hand, positive rights necessarily involve the exercise of
management influence or power, which is precisely the kind of activity
that one might worry about with SWFs, i.e., that management is
influenced to do something that inures to the political benefit of the
SWF. Exercising positive rights makes you an activist, but exercising
negative rights makes you a responsible shareholder.203
While positive governance activities may raise suspicion with
regulators, depending on the political relations between the host country
and the SWF sponsor country, negative governance efforts merely set
limits to or check managerial behavior,204 and are less likely to concern
regulators. These are generalities, of course, that will not hold for every
SWF investing in the United States. Particular decisions by SWFs with
respect to corporate governance are intensely context-specific. A given
SWF must consider the effects of its activism on numerous parties,
including corporate managers and other shareholders, host country
regulators, home country citizens, and regulators in other countries in
which the SWF has or invested or may invest in the future. The political
relationship between the SWF sponsor country and the host country
plays a large role in shaping governance behavior, as does economic
necessity (a desperate host country may welcome investments that it
would otherwise prefer to discourage; see, for example, the investments
by numerous SWFs in U.S. financial institutions in 2008–09).205
Finally, layered on to these factors, internal pressures may encourage
certain types of engaged governance behavior, as with Norway’s
environmental and social shareholder activism.
202.
203.
204.

See 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(c) (2012).
See Rose, Qatar Holdings an “Activist Investor”?, supra note 199.
Examples of negative governance include merger approvals, exercise of voting
rights, approval or ratification of transactions in which there is self-dealing, and the
creation of bounded governance structures, such as supermajority approval
requirements for certain transactions or for certain governance changes. Negative
governance is typified by rules creation and approval of major events, but passivity
with respect to most other management decision-making.
205. See Rose, supra note 155, at 1230–36.
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CONCLUSION
SWFs as a group are still finding their way as investors. While
some SWFs are very sophisticated investors, others are still developing
their investment capabilities. So it is with SWF engagement in
corporate governance.
While a few SWFs have sophisticated
governance engagement programs in place, most do not invest in
corporate governance. I have argued that this consequence is not solely
the result of SWF choices, however; regulatory frameworks in the U.S.
and elsewhere discourage engagement by SWFs. This is not to say that
all SWFs should engage in positive corporate governance. However,
they should at least have the ability to effectively engage in negative
governance efforts, and markets and regulators should expect SWFs to
engage in such efforts.
Available empirical evidence indicates that markets tend to
welcome minority SWF investment, but some studies suggest the
presence of suspicions that SWFs will engage in tunneling or political
activities.
SWFs can alleviate these suspicions by enhancing
transparency of when and how they engage in corporate governance
efforts. Regulators can promote engagement and responsible sovereign
investing by providing greater transparency regarding their regulatory
efforts.

